A project of the Gandhi Centennial Committee of Southern Illinois University, the book outlines the basic tenets of Gandhian philosophy as interpreted by Western thinkers, deals with problems of American education, and offers some reflec­tions on what kinds of solutions may be posed by educators, primarily at the university level. The Foreword and Epilogue are by two distinguished Indian educators, _K. L. Shrimali_, Vice-chancellor, and _N. A. Nikam_, former Vice-chancellor, University of Mysore.

SS RAMA RAO PAPPU PROFESSOR PT RAJU: EVOLUTION OF HIS PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT "In India (PT Raju) represents and is really the original initiator of, ...

Containing Both Intellectually Stimulating And Academically Entertaining Essays And Papers Presented At The Fifteenth International Congress Of Vedanta In The United States, This Book Honours The Congress Founder, Professor Rama Rao Pappu. This Volume Analytically Discusses The Ideologies Of Shankara, Ramanuja, Madhva, Vallabha, Tyagaraja And Satya Sai Baba.

Containing Both Intellectually Stimulating And Academically Entertaining Essays And Papers Presented At The Fifteenth International Congress Of Vedanta In The United States, This Book Honours The Congress Founder, Professor Rama Rao Pappu. This Volume Analytically Discusses The Ideologies Of Shankara, Ramanuja, Madhva, Vallabha, Tyagaraja And Satya Sai Baba.

The crystallization behaviour of Fe 70.8 Nb 3.7 Cu 1 Al 2.7 Mn 0.7 Si 13.5 B 7.6 alloy prepared in the form of amorphous ribbons by melt-spinning technique was studied using differential scanning calorimetry and the temperature variation in resistivity. An X-ray diffaction and transmission electron microscopy study showed the formation of f -Fe and/or Fe 3 nanoparticles after the first stage of crystallization. The activation energy for this nanophase formation was 68 kcal mol m 1 . The brittleness (...) of the alloy increased with the formation of nanoparticles after heat treatment. Superior soft magnetic properties were achieved when the material was heat treated at 790 K for 15 min. The particle size at the optimum heat treatment condition for superior soft magnetic properties was found to be 6.0 - 0.5 nm which was less compared than for the Fe-Nb-Cu-Si-B system. The observed coercivity value at the optimum heat treatment condition was found to be 0.32 A m m 1 . The presence of Al in the alloy reduced the particle size and the magnetic anisotropy energy of the system, which resulted in superior soft magnetic properties of the heat-treated materials. (shrink)

This study investigates the relative influences of professional values and selected demographic variables on the ethical perceptions of services marketing professionals. The relationship between ethical perceptions and ethical judgments of service marketers is also examined. The data were obtained from a mail survey of the American Marketing Association's professional members of service industries. The survey results indicate a positive relationship between a service professional's professional values and his/her perceptions of ethical problems. The results also suggest that ethical judgments of a (...) service professional can be partially explained by his/her perceptions of ethical problems. Implications of the research findings were discussed. (shrink)

This study compares Australian marketers with those in the United States along lines that are particular to the study of ethics. The test measured two different moral philosophies, idealism and relativism, and compared perceptions of ethical problems, ethical intentions, and corporate ethical values. According to Hofstede''s cultural typologies, there should be little difference between American and Australian marketers, but the study did find significant differences. Australians tended to be more idealistic and more relativistic than Americans and the other results were (...) mixed, making it difficult to generalize about the effects of moral philosophies on the components of ethical decision-making measured here. This is an important finding; as firms become increasingly more globalized, marketers will more often be involved in cross-cultural ethical dilemmas and it seems natural to assume that similar cultures will have similar ethical orientations. That assumption may well prove erroneous. (shrink)

Now, we can draw a conclusion on the matter of the necessity of angādhikāra in Pā $$ \underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{n}$$ ini's grammar. We have seen that angādhikāra constitutes a very important section of the grammar where the relation of the suffixes and their bases is crucial. We also have observed that the concept of anga cannot be separated from Pā $$ \underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{n}$$ ini's system due to its being a part of many sūtras as well as many paribhā $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{s}$$ ās. We have also (...) seen that at least three exclusive prayojanas exist for the justification of angādhikāra. Another justification can be given in the form of preventing the double samprasāra $$ \underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{n}$$ a in forms like vavraś which we discussed while determining the limit of angādhikāra. We saw that three important paribhā $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{s}$$ ās, which are accepted by Patañjali, depend on angādhikāra. Finally we saw that an alternative suggested by Patañjali for angādhikāra is in no way better, but actually defective.Kātyāyana's use of angādhikāra in other sections to counter some objections has been shown too. Patañjali's apparent rejection of angādhikāra on the basis of Kātyāyana's vārtika on ‘angasya’ (6-4-1) is not supported by his own treatment of the subject in other places. So, we conclude that Patañjali did not really intend to refute the angādhikāra and the view which appears in his commentary on 6-4-1 should not be taken as his siddhānta on this matter. Tasmād angādhikāra iti bhagavato gūdho 'bhisandhir iti bhāvah. Naitāni ity ādi grantha $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{h}$$ ekadeśyuktir iti tātparyam. Nāgeśa, ‘Uddyota’, MB, Vol. 5, p. 273.Thus the necessity of angādhikāra in Pā $$ \underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{n}$$ ini's A $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{s}$$ $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{t}$$ ādhyāyī is established. (shrink)

A. P. Rao is considered to be one of India's leading, modern philosophers. In this compelling new monograph, he discusses the unique philosophical energies and synergies between Russell and Wittgenstein's seminal works and re-interprets the logical-positivist thrust of language and mathematical philosophy in this century and into the next.

Now, we can draw a conclusion on the matter of the necessity of angādhikāra in Pā $$ \underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{n}$$ ini's grammar. We have seen that angādhikāra constitutes a very important section of the grammar where the relation of the suffixes and their bases is crucial. We also have observed that the concept of anga cannot be separated from Pā $$ \underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{n}$$ ini's system due to its being a part of many sūtras as well as many paribhā $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{s}$$ ās. We have also (...) seen that at least three exclusive prayojanas exist for the justification of angādhikāra. Another justification can be given in the form of preventing the double samprasāra $$ \underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{n}$$ a in forms like vavraś which we discussed while determining the limit of angādhikāra. We saw that three important paribhā $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{s}$$ ās, which are accepted by Patañjali, depend on angādhikāra. Finally we saw that an alternative suggested by Patañjali for angādhikāra is in no way better, but actually defective.Kātyāyana's use of angādhikāra in other sections to counter some objections has been shown too. Patañjali's apparent rejection of angādhikāra on the basis of Kātyāyana's vārtika on ‘angasya’ (6-4-1) is not supported by his own treatment of the subject in other places. So, we conclude that Patañjali did not really intend to refute the angādhikāra and the view which appears in his commentary on 6-4-1 should not be taken as his siddhānta on this matter. Tasmād angādhikāra iti bhagavato gūdho 'bhisandhir iti bhāvah. Naitāni ity ādi grantha $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{h}$$ ekadeśyuktir iti tātparyam. Nāgeśa, ‘Uddyota’, MB, Vol. 5, p. 273.Thus the necessity of angādhikāra in Pā $$ \underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{n}$$ ini's A $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{s}$$ $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{t}$$ ādhyāyī is established. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:A Time of Novelty: Logic, Emotion, and Intellectual Life in Early Modern India, 1500-1700 C.E. by Samuel WrightAnusha Rao (bio)A Time of Novelty: Logic, Emotion, and Intellectual Life in Early Modern India, 1500-1700 C.E. By Samuel Wright. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021. Pp. xxi + 278. Paper $99.00, isbn 978-0-197568-16-3Samuel Wright's A Time of Novelty examines the discipline of Nyāya, or Sanskrit logic, between 1500 and 1700 CE (...) and argues that novelty, both as an intellectual and affective category, was the structuring principle through which Nyāya intellectuals built a philosophical community in early modernity. Wright uses a set of essays and commentaries by Nyāya philosophers on a range of topics to reflect on how intellectual life in this period was shaped by critical inquiry, emotion, and manuscript culture.The book studies a very fruitful, if contentious, period within the history of Sanskrit intellectual disciplines. Sheldon Pollock's "Sanskrit Knowledge Systems on the Eve of Colonialism" (SKSEC project) was the first to draw attention to this period as early modernity in India. Pollock has pointed to both parallels with and differences from modernity in Europe. Since then, scholarly attention has been directed to how periodizing techniques were used by Nyāya intellectuals, and to the relationship that these "new" Nyāya intellectuals had with the tradition. While Wright is in general agreement with the aims of the SKSEC project, he argues against focusing exclusively on intellectual historical change without understanding the values and sentiments that underwrite intellection. For this reason, the book undertakes the challenging task of linking a set of understudied Nyāya arguments with philosophy of emotions to understand affective novelty. This offers interesting insights into the emotional concerns behind Nyāya intellection in a way that earlier scholarship has been unable to, but it has the disadvantage of imposing frameworks alien to Nyāya philosophers onto their arguments--such as Wright's arguments about how space is produced in chapter 3.The book is organized into six chapters, each of which deals with an important topic within Nyāya arguments in early modern India. While the first four chapters, titled "Doubt," "Objectivity," "Happiness," and "Dying," directly deal with these contentious issues and debates around them by Nyāya thinkers, in the last two chapters, "Space" and "Time," Wright does not take up specific arguments from primary texts, but focuses on how we can best understand the space that Nyāya intellectuals inhabited and how novelty can be conceptualised in time. [End Page 1]In the first chapter on doubt, Wright zooms in on arguments about how doubting cognitions emerge, focusing particularly on Raghunātha Śiromaṇi and how commentators present his novel position on the issue. Earlier Nyāya intellectuals argued that speech and other indirect forms of perception could not generate doubting cognitions. Instead, they advanced a theory of apperceptive doubt, where doubt arises in a subsequent, remembering cognition. Raghunātha, on the other hand, argues that doubting cognitions can arise directly from speech, and he substantially changes the definition of doubt, a change which is noted and carefully explained by his commentators. Beginning with the theory of doubt allows Wright to then examine how the new definition of doubt leads to structural changes in the crafting of Nyāya debates, particularly in genres such as the short essay (vāda), where the topic of contention is stated in the newly developed format. Wright also links this debate with the notion of trust. Careful attention to how the debate is framed by commentators also underscores the emotional underpinnings of the argument--the "old" view is not to be trusted, since it does not stand up to reasoning (p. 60). Doubting cognitions are not ignored in Nyāya, but become the beginning point of debates and discussions, demonstrating that Nyāya philosophers in early modern India were fashioning a community that engaged peers through new ways of understanding and caring about critical inquiry.The second chapter focuses on arguments around objectivity and deals at greater length with the periodizing techniques used by Nyāya thinkers in the early modern period. This... (shrink)

Abstract:S. N. Balagangadhara, Sarika Rao, Jakob De Roover, and Marianne Keppens One of the best-known aspects of Indian society is its "rigid caste system" and the "evil practices of untouchability." It is a truism today to say that Indian society is divided into four castes, which are not allowed to mix. Many Indian texts are brought forward as evidence of this understanding of Indian society. The ancient Indian text Mānavadharmaśāstra or "Laws of Manu" takes a central place in such accounts. (...) This is especially the case for its verses on varṇasankara, translated as "mixing of social classes" or "intermixture of castes." Given the important role these verses play in the understanding of Indian culture, society, and policymaking, it is crucial to translate them accurately. Using one verse in one text, this article focuses on the standard translation and deals both critically and constructively with the received view. (shrink)

Chapter Promising in Law and Morals Promissory and contractual obligations raise many issues of common interest to philosophers and lawyers. ...

Throughout much of human history most people conceived of death as a transitional event. An alternative, secular, conception of death is as the permanent cessation of all life‐sustaining biological functions. The death of the physical organism is the death of the person or human being. However death be conceived, human beings are the only creatures that are aware of their mortality. The death penalty is often thought to be the most severe punishment of all, far worse than life imprisonment. Attitudes (...) towards death vary according to the acceptance or rejection of belief in an afterlife. Death in old age is generally held to be less deplorable than death in one's prime. Premature death, however, is commonly deemed to be tragic, but not because merely being alive is a good of one kind or another, let alone good in itself. Lucretius exaggerated the symmetry between prenatal and post‐ mortem events. (shrink)

Global fatalism is an attitude towards life, an attitude of resignation and acceptance of what happens. Global fatalism in the form of predestinarianism is typically, but not exclusively, associated with monotheism rather than with polytheism, and in particular with Christianity and Islam. An individual form of fatalism consists in the belief that specific incidents in a person's life are preordained. Local fatalism appears to be common to many different cultures and societies. Individual fatalism is associated with other important events in (...) human life, such as meeting the person with whom one is destined to fall in love. The ubiquity of the various forms of individual fatalism suggests that they have a deep appeal to human sentiment. Descartes's successors, lumbered with dualism but rejecting causal interaction, struggled to preserve human freedom while acknowledging nomological determinism. Global nomological determinism is a picture, a preconception of the nature of change in all its forms. (shrink)

Happiness has been at the centre of philosophical reflection ever since Plato and Aristotle. Epicureans thought of happiness as the satisfaction of one's minimal needs and the absence of further desires. True happiness may be the love of another, or successful and virtuous public service recognized by society, or successful engagement in a favoured activity. Youthful happiness involves intensity of feeling, engagement with the passing moment, the discovery of first love and of sexuality, and the joys of dedication to a (...) beloved. The different forms of human engagement involve different kinds of happiness. Physical normality and good health are patently preconditions of happiness inasmuch as physical abnormalities and persistent diseases are barriers to leading a healthy and normal human life. A person's social conditions are highly relevant to the possibility of happiness. Happiness can be marred or shattered by a multitude of accidents of fate and by human malice, political upheavals, and economic disasters. (shrink)

A life devoid of meaning is a life without happiness. But one may find meaning in one's life and in one's activities without being happy. Like pleasure and happiness, goodness and beauty, the meaningfulness one may find in one's life comes in degrees. Many achievements may mean something to a person without being of sufficient significance to lend meaning to their life, such as winning in some competitive activity or passing an important examination. Forms of illusory meaning, that is meaning (...) that rests on false or misconceived beliefs, can impart meaning to a person's life and make it genuinely meaningful, as long as it involves neither evil doing nor evil beliefs. The human condition as language‐using, self‐conscious social animals with limited capacities for good and evil, with highly competitive and killer instincts is anything but ludicrous, farcical, silly, or ridiculous. (shrink)

The key to a perspicuous overview of axiology is the realization that all values arise from life. This chapter provides a brief overview of von Wright's categories, or ‘varieties’, of goodness. Medical goodness is the most elemental variety of natural value and disvalue. Any language‐using creature that has the skills to make and to use tools, instruments, and other artefacts is going to need the concepts of artefactual goodness and its subcategory of instrumental goodness. Morality is essentially a social phenomenon (...) – it is an aspect of the form of life of a community. In evolved societies, it overlaps with and fades into law, into social mores or small morals, and into individual critical morality. Virtue, or moral goodness, as well as the moral virtues, which are moral character traits, are attributes of social beings who are, and who identify themselves as being, members of a community, people, or nation. (shrink)

Von Wright argued that moral goodness is a derivative form of goodness. He proceeded to give an account of the moral goodness of an act, in terms of the good of man. Philosophical anthropology must render the phenomenon of morality intelligible. This chapter suggests that the roots of moral value lie in human sympathy, in maternal love, in intuitive recognition of the humanity of others, and in the nature of loving friendship. The sentiment of sympathy is virtually ubiquitous, but sympathetic (...) propensities vary from person to person, being partly a function of their imagination. Sympathy is an emotional tap‐root of moral reasons and a presupposition of moral reasoning. Kant's argument in support of a requirement of equal formal respect for human beings as moral agents is problematic. The explicit emergence of the idea of formal respect is one of the great advances in our evolving understanding of human nature and our conception of ourselves. (shrink)